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Abstract
In this paper I will delve into Li Zehou’s idea that “harmony is higher than justice (hexie 
gaoyu zhengyi 和諧高於正義)”. Firstly, I will situate this proposal within the context of 
the contemporary debate on harmony and justice in Western and Chinese traditions. The 
position Li holds generally belongs to those who see justice and harmony as representa-
tive of a West-East difference. However, it can be developed to promote a more nuanced 
understanding. After giving due consideration, brief though it must be, to his argument, 
I will sketch some of the other major views on the relationship between harmony and 
justice, providing a critique from Li’s perspective. In the final section I seek to expand on 
Li’s theory by outlining a more collaborative path for thinking about harmony and justice.
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Li Zehoujeva ideja »harmonija je višja od pravičnosti«: kontekst in kolabora-
tivna prihodnost
Izvleček
V pričujočem članku avtor obravnava Li Zehoujevo idejo o tem, da je »harmonija višja od 
pravičnosti (hexie gaoyu zhengyi 和諧高於正義)«. To predpostavko najprej umesti v kon-
tekst sodobnih razprav o harmoniji in pravičnosti znotraj zahodnih in kitajskih tradicij. 
Na splošno spada Lijeva pozicija med tiste, za katere vprašanje o pravičnosti in harmoniji 
odraža razlike med vzhodom in zahodom. Vendar pa jo je mogoče obravnavati tudi v okviru 
bolj niansiranega razumevanja. Po krajši obravnavi tega argumenta avtor skicira nekatera 
druga osrednja razumevanja razmerja med harmonijo in pravičnostjo ter predstavi Lijevo 
kritiko le-teh. V zaključnem delu avtor poskuša nadgraditi oziroma razširiti Lijevo teorijo 
s pomočjo vzpostavitve bolj kolaborativne metode razmišljanja o harmoniji in pravičnosti.    
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Introduction: Appreciating Harmony and Justice
In recent years there has been a growing trend for comparative studies on “har-
mony” and “justice” in philosophical and political circles. Broadly speaking, there 
are two camps in these discussions. Firstly, there are those, such as Li Zehou 李
澤厚 (2014), Henry Rosemont (1988), and Roger Ames (2011), who contend 
that we can use these concepts to distinguish between general trends in Western 
and Chinese philosophical discourses writ large. Secondly, there are those, such as 
Huang Yushun 黃玉順 (2013; 2015) and Erin Cline (2013),1 who find theories 
or “senses” of justice in both traditions—and similarly some scholars, including Li 
Chenyang (2014) and Yu Jiyuan (2016), who see appreciations of harmony and 
justice in both traditions. Thus, harmony and justice are often used to either parse 
out the differences between these traditions, or as evidence of some commonality 
between them. However, a third perspective can be introduced. Li Zehou’s pro-
posal that “harmony is higher than justice” is particularly conducive to developing 
an alternative “collaborative” view on the relationship between the two notions—
one that goes beyond both camps, including Li Zehou’s own classifications.
At their extremes, harmony and justice could hardly be more dissimilar. A naïve 
take on harmony sees it as “innocence” or “consistency.” As Li Chenyang (2014) 
argues, one version of this is represented in Max Weber’s (1951) and Martha 
Nussbaum’s (1990) critical presentations, where harmony is coupled with same-
ness or identity and eschews any divergences.2 Everything matches a pre-deter-
mined order, which neutralizes the very possibility, and reality, of conflict. Sim-
ilarly, the extremes of justice—as demonstrated by Michael Sandel (1982) and 
Li Zehou’s (2014) respective criticisms of John Rawls and others—are overly 
reliant on adhering to abstract principles, prioritizing reason at the expense of 
emotional considerations, and a conception of the person devoid of concrete ties 
to communities and others. While these extreme versions of harmony and justice 
are not necessarily juxtaposed, they are decidedly distinct. But as we move either 
harmony or justice into the practical sphere, or when critics or proponents of 
either talk about their actual implementation, we often find that the differences 
between the two begin to blur and dissolve. In other words, harmony and jus-
tice tend to share more in common in actual practice than in their theoretical 
accounts. Here their respective dissimilarities read more like nuanced emphases 
1 Huang Yushun and Erin Cline only represent a small number of scholars who have written on 
justice in early Chinese philosophy. Their works, which will be discussed below, are the most recent 
monographs on this topic. However, there are many others who have also addressed this issue. For 
example, Cline points out distinctive arguments for early Confucian notions of justice in the works 
of Randall Peerenboom, Alan Fox, Xunwu Chen 陳勛武, Yang Xiao 蕭陽, and Ruiping Fan 范瑞
平 (Cline 2013, 16–18). 
2 For more on this, see Li Chenyang 2014.
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rather than stark discrepancies. One way of making sense of the complex rela-
tionship between justice and harmony involves understanding their historical 
developments, and envisioning their ideal relationship. Li Zehou’s reading seems 
to involve this twofold task. While suggesting that all moral principles are prod-
ucts of historical trends, Li Zehou proposes the idea that “harmony is higher 
than justice” as a way towards thinking about a more collaborative interaction 
between the two notions. Even though Li himself uses harmony and justice as 
ideal types for the Chinese and Western philosophical traditions, his proposal 
opens up the possibility of symbiosis.  
In what follows I will offer a detailed account of Li Zehou’s idea that “harmony is 
higher than justice”, situating it within the context of the abovementioned debate. 
Though generally understood as belonging to those who see justice and harmony 
as points of difference between Western and Eastern thought, Li Zehou seems to 
promote a more nuanced understanding, which reveals an inherent connectivity 
and complementary relationship between the two notions. After briefly present-
ing Li Zehou’s argument, I will provide a summary of some of the other major 
views on the relationship between harmony and justice, examining them critically 
from Li Zehou’s standpoint. In the final section, building upon Li Zehou’s theory, 
I will outline a more collaborative path for thinking about harmony and justice. 
I will attempt to demonstrate that, rather than comparing or contrasting the two 
notions, taking a collaborative perspective enables and points out the need for 
harmony and justice to function as mutually informative and corrective. When 
the two are viewed as integrated we may actually gain a much richer appreciation 
of not only the comparison of Chinese and Western philosophies, but of ethics, 
morality, and order as such.
Harmony versus Justice
In this section I will sketch the discussions given by three proponents of the argu-
ment that harmony and justice are critically dissimilar notions—that early Confu-
cian thought focuses mainly on harmony as opposed to justice, and that the em-
phasis in the Western tradition is exactly the opposite. As mentioned above, I will 
outline the relevant works of Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames, before turning to 
Li Zehou’s idea that “harmony is higher than justice”. Here is worth acknowledging 
that the lack of any lexical equivalent to “justice” in early Chinese has been widely 
noted.3 Indeed, some have suggested that the modern translations “zhengyi 正義” 
3 For an excellent discussion on this, reviewing thinkers such as Randell Peerenboom, Alan Fox, 
Xunwu Chen, Yang Xiao, Ruiping Fan, Henry Rosemont, Roger Ames, Brian Van Norden and 
others, see Cline 2013, 8–18.
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and “gongzheng 公正” have more to offer for theories of justice as they are similar 
yet alternative notions. This issue will not be addressed at length here.4 Below I will 
focus instead on how scholars have dealt with conceptions of harmony and justice as 
distinguishing features of Chinese and Western philosophical traditions. 
Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames have long been outspoken critics of any at-
tempt to read (overly) Western concepts and vocabulary into classical Chinese 
thought—perhaps even to an extreme. Their general position, and reason for 
holding this view, is summarized by Rosemont: “to learn not simply about, but 
from other cultures”, which means “we must endeavor to let their thinkers speak to 
us as much as possible in their terms, not ours”. (Rosemont 2015, 27) Rosemont 
further extends this position in a provocative argument:
the only way it can be maintained that a particular concept was held by 
an author is to find a term expressing that concept in his text. Thus we 
cannot say so-and-so had a “theory of X”, or that he “espoused X princi-
ples”, if there is no X in the lexicon of the language in which the author 
wrote. (Rosemont 1988, 41) 
According to Erin Cline, who also refers to this quote and to Rosemont’s claim 
that there is no semantic equivalent for justice, Rosemont “maintains that without 
a term for ‘justice’ in classical Chinese, we cannot show that the concept of jus-
tice exists in classical Confucian thought” (Cline 2013, 11). Indeed, in his most 
recent book Rosemont mentions justice at the top of his list for topics that might 
inhibit us from understanding Chinese texts “in their own terms” (Rosemont 2015, 
5). Cline’s use of the word “concept” is quite accurate here. For Rosemont would 
likely agree that there is no “concept” of justice in early Chinese texts—however 
we should not assume that this equals a lack of any appreciation for justice. In 
other words, for Rosemont, the Western and Chinese traditions differ in that the 
former has a concept of justice, and the latter does not. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that there is no conception or sense of justice in the latter.5 
4 Li Zehou and Yang Guorong 杨国荣 have both suggested that zhengyi 正義 and gongzheng 公正 
are separate concepts, neither of which are fully in line with modern notions of justice. According 
to Li Zehou gongzheng is more closely related to public “consulting” (xieshang 協商) in establishing 
“consensus” (gongshi 共识), and zhengyi has to do with “natural principles” (tianli 天理) and 
“argumentation” (liyi 理義) (Li Zehou 2015, 7). Li Zehou adds that “gongzheng has more to do 
with reason, whereas zhengyi includes more emotional elements” (ibid., 8). Yang argues that “the 
cognate gongzheng often refers to the values of gong and zheng” which he defines as “transcending 
individuality and privacy (si 私)” and “integrity, fairness, and appropriateness” respectively (Yang 
2014, 215). Though it is well worth looking at the way the uniquely Chinese notions of gongzheng 
and zhengyi can contribute to discussions of justice, it falls outside the scope of this paper.
5 Here I am loosely referring to Rawls’s distinction between a “concept of justice” and a “conception 
of justice”. For Rawls the general difference is that the concept of justice refers to an actual theory, 
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Since justice is not a major focus of Rosemont’s studies, it is perhaps best to 
turn to his long-time friend and collaborator, Roger Ames. Both Rosemont and 
Ames share in finding the Chinese and Western traditions different in terms of 
lacking and having a specific concept of justice. However, they do not suggest 
there is nothing similar to “justice” in Confucian texts. Indeed, there is certainly 
sufficient room here for appreciating the values associated with theories of jus-
tice in a different way—one which begins with respecting concrete experience 
as fundamental for all moral and ethical claims. In other words, we can derive 
some Confucian understandings of something like “justice”, even though they 
are decidedly dissimilar from the theories of justice commonly found in Western 
traditions. Ames writes,
And the notion of justice—rather than being an appeal to abstract prin-
ciples to enforce a blind impartiality that requires all particular differ-
ences to be set aside and all persons be treated equally—references the 
complex, creative process of achieving what is most appropriate in the 
specific, usually inequitable relations and situations that locate us within 
family and community. The resolutely hierarchical and dynamic pattern 
of the human experience that begins in family relations is going to have 
to be included in the equation that expresses a Confucian notion of justice. 
Such a Confucian understanding of freedom, equality, and justice, with-
out deploying such terms specifically, is nested in the concrete project of 
achieving consummate conduct (ren) by being optimally appropriate (yi) 
in one’s proper roles and relations (li). (Ames 2011, 123; italics added)
Thus, for Rosemont and Ames the lack of any lexical equivalent to “justice” in 
early Chinese is significant in that it shows there is no abstract concept or theory 
of justice. This is a true dividing point between Western and Chinese traditions. 
But it does not preclude the possibility of developing uniquely Chinese notions of 
justice derived from appreciations and senses of justice or associated values found 
already in classical texts.
Similarly, Li Zehou finds the Chinese and Western traditions can be broadly dif-
ferentiated in terms of emphasizing abstract principle-based justice on the one 
hand and considering concrete particulars in working towards harmonious interac-
tions on the other. Li Zehou writes, “Chinese culture looks for harmony where the 
whereas a “conception of justice is an interpretation of [its] role” (Rawls 1999, 9). For Rosemont, 
as will be explicated in the analysis of Ames, we could say that a “concept of justice” refers to 
abstract principles or rules, whereas a “conception of justice” speaks to ideas or values that might 
be similar to, or enhance, a general theory of justice. Thus, Rosemont might admit that certain 
aspects of “humaneness” (ren 仁), “ritual propriety” (li 禮), and even Confucian Role Ethics, include 
understandings of fairness or (graded) equality that are somewhat similar to some theories of justice. 
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West strives for justice” (Li Zehou 2016, 1093). In this way Li Zehou’s argument is 
somewhat more decisive than Rosemont’s or Ames’s in assigning justice as a con-
cern of Western traditions and harmony as an ideal for Chinese ones. Compared 
to Rosemont’s or Ames’s accounts, however, Li Zehou also provides a much more 
robust description of how theories of justice and understandings of harmony can 
interact. For Li Zehou, the difference between justice and harmony involves distinct 
emphasis on the role of reason and emotion in moral consideration. Harmony in 
China is based on emotion, which is cemented in ritual. These rituals are, in turn, 
“generated from emotionality” and are intimately related to guanxi 關係 (“personal 
relationships”) (ibid., 1079). Justice, on the other hand, is both a product of, and 
places absolute value upon, reason. Instead of concentrating on human relationships 
and interactions, justice prioritizes the individual—as abstracted from relationships 
and concrete particulars. Thus, while Chinese harmony includes both emotional and 
rational elements, Western theories of justice have generally not been inclusive of 
emotions, and thereby comparatively impoverished. In this way harmony is clearly 
“higher” than justice, it binds both emotional and rational considerations, while jus-
tice is limited to rational judgments alone. To better understand what this means we 
need to consider Li Zehou’s overall moral theory.
Harmony is Higher than Justice
Li Zehou’s moral philosophy is concentrated on what he considers his most 
significant contribution to moral discourse, namely, his so-called “two-morality 
theory” (liang de lun 兩德論). Most Western thinkers, Li Zehou contends, have 
failed to recognize the distinction between two types of morality, namely “reli-
gious morality” (zongjiaoxing daode 宗教性道德) and “social morality” (shehuixing 
daode 社會性道德). “‘Religious morals’ involve personal beliefs, moral convictions, 
values, and conceptions of the good.” They are “also the seat of moral virtue and 
an important element of individual education” (D’Ambrosio, Carleo, and Lam-
bert 2016, 1064). In contrast to religious morals, social morals are more closely 
associated with abstract notions such as reason, justice, freedom, independence, 
and human rights. Social morals developed out of shamanistic ceremonies, which 
were the earlier predecessors of social customs, including norms, practices, and 
other social arrangements (chengxu 程式) necessary to sustain society. In terms of 
Chinese philosophy, we can find expressions of this morality connected to “ritual” 
or “ritual limitations” (li 禮).6
In the Confucian tradition “ritual” (li 禮) needs to be understood in a concrete 
sense. While more abstract “dogmas”, “principles”, or “doctrines (jing 經)” exist, 
6 “Ritual limitations” is Li Zehou’s own (suggested) translation.
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they need to be checked by “expedients”, “measuring”, or “discerning”  (quan 權)
methods that allow them to be implemented (Li Zehou 2013, 89).
In this way [Li Zehou] argues that morality is constituted by the actual-
ization of a harmonious balance between guiding regulations and appro-
priateness (fandao he shidang 範導和適當). Dogmas and doctrines, such 
as universal moral principles, need to be negotiated with the particulars 
of the actual situation in order to figure out the “proper measure” or “de-
gree” (du 度) to which the universal principle should be actualized. One 
finds a balance between contingent conditions of the situation and ideal 
doctrines. This means, for example, that there are limits on when treating 
people as ends is proper. In extreme circumstances, such as war or ter-
rorist threats, people can be used as means, and torture or sacrificing one 
person to save many others may be the moral thing to do. Li defends this 
position as being in line with both reason and emotions (heqingheli 合
情合理), which he believes differentiates Confucian harmony from ap-
proaches to morality and justice in the Western tradition. (D’Ambrosio 
2016, 726)
According to Li Zehou, the Chinese tradition is far better than the Western tra-
dition in appreciating the importance of “proper measure” (du 度). This is due in 
large part to the former’s understanding of the role emotions have in moral be-
haviour. Li Zehou introduces his neologism “emotio-rational structure” to explain 
the foundational role of emotions. He writes:
The emotio-rational structure refers to the concrete intersection of emo-
tion with reason and emphasizes that emotions and reason exist in dy-
namic, constantly changing relationships of different ratios and propor-
tions with one another. (Li Zehou 2014, 38)
Harmony trades on incorporating emotions into moral understanding—and not 
simply as a matter of consideration, but as an integral part of moral judgment (or 
perhaps better understood as a “moral sense”) itself. In this way harmony is taken 
to be higher than justice:
Li states his position clearly in a phrase he frequently repeats: “har-
mony is higher than justice” (hexie gaoyu zhengyi 和諧高於正義). He 
further claims that the Western philosophical tradition fails to notice 
this fact (ibid., 25). Accordingly, he finds systemic flaws in the individ-
ualism advocated by Western philosophy. Individualism theorizes about 
the individual abstractly, which sets the ground for isolating reason and 
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extracting principles from concrete situations. The focus then lies on jus-
tice as an abstract set of rationally defined rules. Chinese culture, on the 
other hand, recognizes the importance of social ties and roles in forming 
the individual. This means that context and emotion are important fac-
tors. Morality is then conceived of as a harmonious interplay of various 
persons who are always embedded in social roles and relationships. Li 
calls this a contrast between individualism and guanxi-ism. Individual-
ism understands the self as an isolated individual that is essentially equal 
to others. Communitarianism, as a development of individualism, only 
admits the importance of social influences on individual identity. Con-
fucian guanxi-ism is unique because it recognizes that individuals are 
constituted by society. (D’Ambrosio 2016, 726–27)
A Western conception of justice is not altogether thrown out. In fact, it is abso-
lutely essential for developing a robust notion of harmony today. Harmony being 
higher than justice does not simply mean it is better, though it does carry this 
connotation. Even more importantly, it means that justice is the foundation upon 
which, and only upon which, harmony can be developed. Especially in today’s 
pluralistic world, where shared social customs, norms, practices, and other social 
arrangements (chengxu 程式) are gradually thinning, justice can be used to form 
the common base upon which harmony can flourish:
Li is adamant that his idea “harmony is higher than justice” means that 
he wants to infuse Western principles of justice into Confucian emo-
tion-based morality, and not that he wants to abandon theories of justice. 
Rational principles [i.e. Western theories of justice] would ideally pro-
vide the grounding upon which emotion-based harmony could be es-
tablished. Li argues that rituals, customs, and social norms are generated 
by emotions (li shengyu qing 禮生於情), which is another way of stating 
that emotions are the substance (qing benti 情本體) of morality. In other 
words, morality is founded upon the rituals, customs, and social norms 
that are solidified patterns of productive and effective human interaction. 
[Li’s theory of ] Guanxi-ism [which stresses that human interaction is 
the foundation of morality] shows that these are based on natural human 
emotions that are developed and cultivated broadly in society and nar-
rowly in the individual’s psychological structures.
In place of disembodied reason used to establish absolute principles of 
justice, Li understands psychological structures as the grounds for moral-
ity. Li envisions psychological structures, guanxi-ism, and the two types 
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of morality in a dialectical relationship. His position begins with a rein-
terpretation of the human. For Li there is no such thing as human nature. 
Li prefers to interpret the term xing 性, commonly translated as “nature”, 
as “psychology”. Furthermore, he argues that human psychological struc-
tures are not entirely given. They develop, both in the individual and the 
species, through time. As expressed in his two-morality theory, Li thinks 
that norms and moral systems develop and are solidified (ningju 凝聚) 
when they are able to meet certain socio-historical conditions. On the 
individual level this means that norms are useful for creating harmony 
in interpersonal relationships given particular social, political, and eco-
nomic circumstances. When an individual internalizes social norms, they 
identify with them both emotionally and rationally, and then act accord-
ingly. Norms are then abstracted and rationalized into moral systems. Li 
praises Confucianism, especially in contrast to the Western tradition, for 
remaining aware of conditional and emotional factors in moral consider-
ations. (D’Ambrosio 2016, 727–28)
Western theories of justice are also founded, Li Zehou thinks, on the solidification 
of individual psychological structures and guanxi-ism. However, these Western 
theories forgot their more particularistic foundations. They became increasingly 
abstract. Philosophers such as John Rawls represent the epitome of this trend. The 
“veil of ignorance” for example, is a useful thought experiment, but it should only 
be incorporated as a regulatory guideline (fandao 範導). Those who find similar 
theories of harmony and/or justice in both Western and Chinese traditions down-
play the significance of their differences. 
Harmony and Justice
Huang Yushun is probably the most prolific scholar of justice in Chinese philo-
sophical thought. His books, Zhongguo zhengyi lun de chongjian 中國正義論的重
建 (2013) (officially translated as Voice From the East: The Chinese Theory of Justice 
[2016]) and Zhonguo zhengyi lun de xingcheng 中國正義論的形成 (2015) (which 
carries the English title The Formation of Chinese Theory of Justice), argue that Chi-
nese Confucianism has a rich tradition of theorizing about justice. Similar to 
many of the authors considered in this paper, Huang sees distinctions between 
the Western notion of justice and the Chinese terms yi 義 and zhengyi 正義. 
Despite this, the differences do not play a major role in Huang’s works. “Justice” is 
looked at in terms of a general, almost common-sense, notion of impartiality and 
fairness. As Huang writes, “from ancient to modern times, both Western coun-
tries and China have had their own issues about justice” (Huang 2016, 17–18). 
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These “issues” mainly concern social and communal organization (Huang 2013, 
9), which require impartiality and fairness and contribute directly to harmony 
(ibid., 17). Justice is then a unifying theme in comparisons between the philo-
sophical concerns in Chinese and Western traditions. 
In Confucius, Rawls, and the Sense of Justice (2013) Erin Cline provides a similar 
argument in her specific comparative study of the Analects and Rawls. Here she 
tackles the position that there is no single term for “justice” in classical Chinese 
from various perspectives to demonstrate that this does not preclude the possibili-
ty that classical Chinese philosophers had an understanding of justice. Using Bry-
an Van Norden’s arguments against this “lexical fallacy” as a starting point (Van 
Norden 2007), Cline notes that, “Although there is a well-developed account of 
self-cultivation in the Analects, a single term does not consistently represent this 
idea in the text” (Cline 2013, 15). Accordingly, the focus is shifted from finding a 
single term or defining a concept of justice, which has been the subject of much 
debate, to a “sense of justice”. Cline defines the “sense of justice” as “the capacity 
to feel or perceive what is fair” (ibid., 18), and thereby circumvents many of the 
potential problems presented in the previous section. 
In general agreement with Rosemont and Ames, Cline does not “think there is 
a full-fledged theory of justice in the Analects” nor is there anything like “rules or 
principles of justice” (Cline 2013, 151). She finds instead that many key terms 
in the Analects, such as “yi 義 (‘rightness’), shu 恕 (‘reciprocity’), Ren 仁 (‘hu-
maneness’), xin 信 (‘trustworthiness’), bu bi 不比 (‘not partial or biased’) zhou 周 
(‘associates widely, keeping the public good in mind’), and xing 刑 (‘punishments 
and the sense of fairness that is associated with them’), contribute to the develop-
ment of a strong sense of justice, which is part of the broader Confucian project 
of self-cultivation and political ideals” (ibid., 152–53). In examining these terms 
Cline provides a nuanced account of how they are used in the Analects, and how 
they comprise a uniquely Confucian sense of justice.
Yi 義, for example, is investigated in terms of how it functions in the Analects be-
fore any definition is given. Ultimately Cline concludes that “yi reflects a sense of 
rightness, fairness, and honesty” (Cline 2013, 139). In other words, yi exemplifies 
the very definition of a sense of justice. Again, this does not imply that a specific 
theory or concept of justice is espoused through yi. Cline cautions, 
yi seems to mean a sense of fairness, although it does not concern fairness 
in the sense of a disposition to adhere to the law or in regard to distri-
bution and retribution. Rather, it means something more like fair-mind-
edness or the tendency to make balanced judgments about persons or 
situations. (Cline 2013, 139–40)
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In Cline’s view, this sense of fairness and justice is so strong in the Analects that 
it actually overrides the goal of harmony. In direct conflict with Li Zehou’s view, 
she argues:
As we have seen, in spite of the social stigma, Kongzi [Confucius] gives 
his daughter in marriage to someone who was convicted of a crime [5.1]. 
In 15.28 he tells us to judge a person’s character for ourselves in spite of 
the fact that others already hate them or love them. In these cases he 
calls us to go against the grain, rather than to accede to the judgments of 
others. This implies that he values fairness and good judgment even when 
they do not help to preserve harmony. Indeed, harmony could be attained 
fairly easily in some cases simply by going along with the judgment of the 
majority. But what Kongzi indicates in these passages is that he thinks 
it is wrong to sacrifice one person for the sake of harmony. Or, perhaps 
more accurately, if one person’s well-being is sacrificed in the name of 
preserving harmony among the majority, then the state of affairs is not 
really harmonious at all. (Cline 2013, 144)
This account of harmony is, as we will see below, extremely oversimplified, which 
results in Cline reading into the text the argument she already wants to make. 
From Li Zehou’s perspective 5.1 is simply about not being too hasty to judge oth-
ers (Li Zehou 1998, 87)—which is exactly what passage 15.28 says: “The master 
said ‘[When] everyone hates [someone/something] one must closely examine it, 
[when] everyone likes [someone/something] one must closely examine it’.” Nei-
ther passage is about going against the grain (and consensus does not, anyway, 
equal harmony) at all. Instead they simply ask people to reflect for themselves. The 
background for this is clearly spelled out in how the notion of a “village worthy” 
has been understood.7
Li Zehou would likely agree with Cline’s appreciation of valuing fairness and 
good judgment in a general sense, but would argue that this is precisely what 
marks the Confucian tradition as holding harmony as an overarching value—not 
something to ever be sacrificed. Additionally, what Cline refers to as “a sense of 
justice” is far too vague for Li Zehou. Introducing the term “justice” adds nothing 
to the comparison, besides blurring otherwise relevant distinctions with a phil-
osophically meaningless gloss. Indeed, Li Zehou points to Rawls in particular 
as representative of a Western take on justice that emphasizes principles, laws, 
abstractness, and reasons, at the expense of emotions, and failing to recognize the 
distinction between “religious morality” (zongjiaoxing daode 宗教性道德)X and 
“social morality” (shehuixing daode 社會性道德). The basis for Rawls’ argument is 
7 See Mengzi “Jin Xin II”.
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a conception of the person as individuated, atomized, and abstracted from their 
concrete environment—a self whose social ties do not meaningfully comprise 
who or what they are. This is true, according to Li Zehou, not simply of Confucian 
accounts of morality and ethics, but of morality and ethics in a universal sense:
Human ethics and morals are built and created by humans, not as atomic 
individuals, but as social, communal people—selves that are the result of 
history, education, and socialization. (Li Zehou 2014, 13)
Although Huang focuses on the importance of social and communal ties in the 
Chinese tradition, Li Zehou would likely criticize Huang’s gloss of “justice” along 
the same lines Cline could be criticized. Huang’s treatment of “justice” neglects 
the historical, social, and philosophical importance of this concept. It amounts 
to appropriating a Western notion of “justice” without properly delineating an 
extremely important division between Western approaches to principles and Chi-
nese ones. Classical Chinese debates, Li Zehou says, are centred around the use 
of jing 經 (dogmas, principles, doctrines) and quan 權 (expedients, measuring, 
discerning) (ibid., 89). The Western tradition is more unilaterally focused on the 
principles or doctrines themselves, and obsessive about matching them without 
exceptions, expedients, or other types of allowances—a perfect theory outweighs 
actual implementation. The Chinese view, with its eye on harmony, balances the 
two sides. 
Despite potential criticisms from Li Zehou’s perspective, Huang and Cline do 
help develop a more robust view of the problem. They hit on one of the central 
philosophical concerns in the discussion of the relationship between harmony 
and justice; namely, where should we draw the line between the two? When is 
preventing, solving, or dealing with conflict more important than preserving 
fairness? When and to what degree should fairness be sacrificed for coopera-
tion? And perhaps most importantly, how should we balance between abstract 
theories (where “justice” dominates) and their concrete implementation (which 
concerns harmony)?
Harmony as Justice, Justice as Harmony
In his book The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony (2014),8 Chenyang Li pro-
vides the first English language monograph on Confucian harmony. Explicating 
the complexity, dynamicity, and richness of the Chinese concept of harmony 
8 Many of the articles in the third issue of the 2016 volume of Dao: A Journal of Comparative 
Philosophy were devoted to a discussion of Chenyang Li’s book, and more reviews and articles are 
currently in the works.
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are his main goals. In doing so Chenyang Li contrasts Chinese harmony, and 
specifically Confucian notions of harmony, with what he calls “consistent” or 
“innocent” harmony. These latter terms are borrowed from interpretations of 
ancient Greek—mostly Pythagorean and Platonic—conceptions of harmony 
that have been popularized by scholars from Max Weber and Karl Popper to 
Stuart Hampshire and Martha Nussbaum. In agreement with these, Chenyang 
Li presents Pythagorean and Platonic understandings of harmony (and justice) 
as established on a pre-set static order;9 requiring conformity that eschews con-
flict or even difference. Using famous Chinese idioms Chenyang Li describes 
this kind of harmony as “a pool of dead water” (yi tan si shui 一潭死水) or “uni-
formity” (tong 同)—which is contrary to Chinese notions of harmony, especially 
Confucian ones (Li Chenyang 2014, 12).
Confucians, Chenyang Li argues, advocate a complex theory of “deep harmo-
ny”, prioritizing relations, interactions, and methods that are “harmonized but not 
identical” (he er bu tong 和而不同). Accordingly, there are at least seven major dif-
ferences between Greek harmony and Confucian harmony.10 The latter includes 
heterogeneity, tension, coordination and cooperation, transformation and growth, 
and renewal, which are, according to Chenyang Li, all absent in the former. Che-
nyang Li concludes that while harmony may be important in both the Western 
and Chinese traditions, the concept differs greatly in terms of the depth of appre-
ciation, and its dynamic and complex nature. 
In The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony Chenyang Li also discusses the impor-
tance of justice in Chinese and Western traditions. Here Chenyang Li recognizes 
a much more productive overlap between Western and Chinese thought. Speak-
ing to Confucianism Chenyang Li writes, 
A harmonious society is a just society. Just societies cannot exist without 
operating principles ... the Confucian ideal of harmony promotes equity 
as a principle of justice, and that equity is an essential characteristic of the 
Confucian harmonious society. (Li Chenyang 2014, 120)
Chenyang Li elaborates, “For Confucians, equity (各得其所 ge de qi suo) is a philo-
sophical principle extending far beyond the legal domain” (Li Chenyang 2014, 122). 
So while he acknowledges that harmony and justice emphasize different aspects of 
individual morality, social ethics, and political structures, Chenyang Li ultimately 
9 There is, of course, a lot of room for discussion here. For example, it is quite easy to give a reading 
of Plato that highlights the importance of developing an exceedingly dynamic and creative notion 
of justice. However, this argument falls outside the scope of this paper.
10 Again, we might easily argue that this depiction of Greek harmony is overly simplistic. But this 
criticism falls outside the scope of this paper.
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finds that the two are mutually dependent. More specifically, Chenyang Li’s use of 
the word “order” provides a suggestive wedge for incorporating justice into a Con-
fucian philosophy of harmony, and vice-versa. Chenyang Li writes, “Although order 
itself is not harmony, harmony cannot be realized without order. ...Order makes it 
possible for harmonizing parties to find their own place in the appropriately struc-
tured system” (Li Chenyang 2014, 70). Again Chenyang Li uses the phrase “letting 
each get its due” (各得其所)11, but here to argue that “sacrifice at lower levels” may 
be required “in order to achieve harmonies at higher levels” (ibid., 8).
For Jiyuan Yu, Chenyang Li presents a perfect starting point for what could be 
called a “collaborative approach” to the issue. The concluding paragraph of Jiyuan 
Yu’s review of The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony reads,
Our discussion of the contrast between the Confucian harmony and the 
Platonic one shows that both sides share points [concerning heteroge-
neity, tension, and coordination and cooperation] but differ over points 
[concerning transformation and growth, and renewal]. However, we also 
found that the most important comparison is that both sides take har-
mony to be “letting each get what is due”. The key question, then, is 
to determine what is due. [...] Li’s work has established a solid starting 
point. From here on, we should try to develop a Confucian rational jus-
tification of the belief that the world is harmonious, to have a more de-
tailed philosophical explanation of determining what is due, and to pro-
vide a clearer guidance of how the Confucian harmony can be achieved 
and maintained “with creative tension” and “in a perpetual process of 
transformation and renewal”. (Yu 2016, 419)
Importantly, while Jiyuan Yu argues for explicating the similarities between Con-
fucian notions of harmony and Platonic ones, this really only serves to form the 
background of his larger point—namely, to develop a rational justification for 
harmony in the world in order to decide how to give each what is due “in a per-
petual process of transformation and renewal” while at the same time maintaining 
“creative tension”.12 
Much of what Chenyang Li says about harmony is in line with Li Zehou’s general 
take on the Chinese tradition. Chenyang Li hits on the major ideas Li Zehou 
signals as important, including downplaying the importance of reason, princi-
ples, and abstract notions of the self in favour of bringing emotions, particularis-
tic-concerns, and a socially/community-constitutive view of the person. However, 
11 The variance in translation of ge de qi suo 各得其所 follows Chenyang Li’s own English renderings.
12 In the longer version of this essay Jiyuan Yu’s arguments will be further examined.
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Li Zehou would likely ask for a more robust notion of justice to ground harmony. 
His idea that “harmony is higher than justice” relies on a thickly construed and 
broadly encompassing notion of justice. Chenyang Li’s take on justice is thus 
too thin, and too simplistic, to achieve what Li Zehou has in mind. Moreover, 
throughout his monograph Chenyang Li clearly expresses the view that harmony 
is a much better way to organize society or develop morality. A superficial reading 
of Li Zehou’s “harmony is higher than justice” might come to the same conclusion, 
but Li Zehou is actually presenting a much more complex argument. Harmony 
being “higher” does not make it patently better. Justice is rather the foundation, a 
grounding that is absolutely essential and extremely difficult to achieve. It incor-
porates the notion of “order” Chenyang Li defines as “equity”—but appreciates 
how extremely difficult and complex bringing about this order can be. Li Zehou 
does not envision justice as limited to “equity” (各得其所) and his critique is far 
more penetrating.
Of all the scholars considered here, Jiyuan Yu’s take on the relationship between 
harmony and justice is perhaps the closest to Li Zehou’s. Yu’s suggestion that 
Chenyang Li provides a good starting point helps elucidate where more work 
needs to be done. Specifically, this means developing a “clearer guidance of how 
the Confucian harmony can be achieved and maintained ‘with creative tension’ 
and ‘in a perpetual process of transformation and renewal’”. To be fair, Li Zehou 
does not present a very clear understanding of either justice or harmony, and both 
are mentioned in rather broad strokes. Li Zehou’s discussion of their relationship 
is extremely typical for his works: he provides compelling outlines for framing 
how philosophical arguments and debates should take place. The precise content 
of discussions is not given by Li Zehou himself. Like Confucius, Mencius, Laozi, 
Zhuangzi, or other masters, Li Zehou offers space for readers to reflect. He con-
structs challenging avenues for thought. But he does not give answers, or pave 
the way. In line with Yu’s comments about Chenyang Li, we might find that Li 
Zehou’s thought can be developed into a more collaborative approach between 
the somewhat different trajectories of harmony and justice.
Collaboration, Mutually Informative, Mutually Corrective
In is important to note that almost all of the scholars mentioned above express 
positive attitudes towards the prospect of a collaborative approach to the relation-
ship between harmony and justice—they simply have not capitalized on it. Cline, 
for example, ends her project expressing an openness to, and even some engage-
ment with, collaborative dialogue: 
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This is one area where the Analects can make a significant contribution to 
ongoing discussions in political philosophy, in ethics, and even … in the 
area of public policy. Indeed, the potential for these kinds of contribu-
tions is one of any things that a comparative study of a sense of justice in 
Rawls and the Analects can help us to see. (Cline 2013, 272)
Although Cline repeatedly claims to be expounding the virtues of a comparative 
approach to justice, her hints at the back-and-forth contributions Rawls and the 
Analects can make to one another is clearly a demonstration of the possibility of 
collaboration. 
Roger Ames approaches the issue more directly, arguing that justice may serve as 
a corrective for harmony. Justice should be used as not only a regulative for the 
construction of harmony, but that it may further regulate notions of harmony 
themselves. Ames writes, 
While the familiar appeal to universals might suffer from the ambiguity 
of practical applications, the Confucian attempt to extend consideration 
to all involved is handicapped by the need for more abstract regulative 
ideals such as courage and justice that provide direction for what is a le-
gitimate claim for consideration and inclusion. (Ames 2011, 268)
Here Ames gives justice a much more staunch role in moral and ethical consider-
ation than Li Zehou—in fact we might venture to say that for Roger Ames “jus-
tice is higher than harmony”.13 Justice may be useful as a foundation for harmony, 
as Li Zehou would have it, but it can also serve as a point of reference for making 
theoretical claims about, and actual implementation of, harmony. 
Over the past few years Ames has increasingly turned to the work of Michael 
Sandel to bolster his claims about the importance of concrete particulars and 
sparing use of abstract principles. In essence, this is a move towards a collaborative 
dialogue between (the way many scholars have classified) Western theories of jus-
tice and Chinese notions of harmony. Truly, Sandel’s criticisms of Rawls’s theory 
of justice and his subsequent arguments about how to productively enrich notions 
of justice from the standpoint of encumberedness, provide a good starting point 
for collaboration with Chinese conceptions of harmony.
However, as Chenyang Li points out, Sandel does not often use the word “har-
mony” (Li Chenyang 2017). In fact, in his book Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice (1982) “harmony” appears only once. This does not, however, mean that 
13 As an anonymous reviewer of this paper accurately comments: “Tempting, yes, but surely that 
would be going too far. He simply acknowledges that justice can be useful as a regulative ideal.”
AS_2020_1_FINAL_FINAL.indd   142 9.1.2020   11:44:21
143Asian Studies VIII (XXIV ), 1 (2020), pp. 127–146
Sandel’s approach lacks any appreciation for harmony—or, to use Cline’s term, 
a “sense” of harmony. Sandel uses the family as an example of where we might 
find some of the “limits of justice”, which, though he does not say it, might mark 
the realm of harmony:
Consider for example a more or less ideal family situation, where re-
lations are governed in large part by spontaneous affection and where, 
in consequence, the circumstances of justice prevail to a relatively small 
degree. Individual rights and fair decision procedures are seldom invoked, 
not because injustice is rampant but because their appeal is pre-empted 
by a spirit of generosity in which I am rarely inclined to claim my fair 
share. Nor does this generosity necessarily imply that I receive out of 
kindness a share that is equal to or greater than the share I would be en-
titled to under fair principles of justice. I may get less. The point is not that 
I get what I would otherwise get, only more spontaneously, but simply that the 
questions of what I get and what I am due do not loom large in the overall 
context of this way of life. (Sandel 1982, 33; emphasis added) 
Considered in the light of what Chenyang Li refers to as “deep harmony”, Sandel 
is certainly promoting something extremely similar to a Chinese or Confucian 
notion of harmony. If we add to this Sandel’s overwhelming emphasis on public 
discourse and public reason, it would not be hard to imagine a notion of justice 
that could include Chenyang Li’s seven defining points of Confucian harmo-
ny (i.e. heterogeneity, tension, coordination and cooperation, transformation and 
growth, and renewal).
The challenge, therefore, is to think about how we might enlarge or broaden 
such an understanding to encompass other aspects of life (or how we already 
do without realizing it). If harmony cannot exist without order, it may be fair 
to say—in line with Li Zehou, and reflecting Plato’s Republic14—that the real 
goal of justice is harmony. Creating a just society is one means for establishing 
harmony in society. So while focusing too narrowly on justice may lead to “dead 
pool” conformity or identity, and focusing too narrowly on harmony may breed 
corruption or unfairness. Through a collaborative dialogue we promote a more 
nuanced appreciation of the two, and their relationship with one another. Ac-
cordingly, we find that they actually have common goals and similar suggestions 
for how we conceive of ethics, morality, and order in individuals, social relation-
ships, and political theories. 
14 We might even read Li Zehou’s entire argument as a development of what Plato writes in the 
Republic.
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Conclusion 
Li Zehou’s study provides an excellent starting point for a serious consideration 
of collaboration between the Western emphasis on justice and the Chinese con-
centration on harmony. Li Zehou argues that harmony “involves transforming 
the people through virtue (education), whereas justice involves governing by law”, 
and believes that both are needed (Li Zehou 2016, 1093). Harmony itself rests on 
a strong foundation of guanxi-ism, proper measure, and emotions (as substance), 
that can only be secured once justice is firmly in place—“justice is higher than 
harmony”. For Li Zehou this claim reflects an actual hierarchy (ibid., 1098). He 
maintains that harmony is higher than justice, because justice is “primarily a ra-
tional principle (li 理), whereas harmony involves the integration of emotionality 
and rationality (qing-li 情理) (ibid., 1069). The broader inclusiveness of harmony 
means that it represents a “higher” ethical understanding, albeit one that should 
be constructed on “just” foundations. Harmony can thus contribute to “checking” 
justice (and vice-versa):
Li thus argues that public reason and modern social morals (especially 
liberal notions such as human rights and justice) are essential to society, 
but sees their outlook of individualistic equality, abstract principles, and 
value neutrality as needing to be supplemented and regulated by tradi-
tional religious morals. This involves proper measure (du 度) and flexibil-
ity (quan 權). (D’Ambrosio, Carleo, and Lambert 2016, 1066)
Read in concert with Sandel’s similar criticisms of overly abstract theories of jus-
tice, and his alternatives, Li Zehou’s view can certainly be developed away from a 
strict hierarchy, including any logical or practical priority contained therein. What 
both Sandel and Li Zehou are moving towards is an ethical and/or moral under-
standing that is neither overly theoretical nor unreflective. An approach where 
reason and emotions inform one another, where abstract ideals and implementa-
tion are balanced. Much of what this entails is already included in Li Zehou’s own 
thought, but deserves to be fleshed out into a full-fledged collaborative project. 
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